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Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.: Banks Find
"Interest" in Credit Card Late Payment Fees
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1863, Congress passed a bill to establish a national banking
system in an effort to provide a national currency and to create a
market for government bonds during the Civil War The following
year, the bill was revised and reenacted to become the National Bank
Act (the NBA) of 1864.2 Interpreting the NBA for the first time in
1873 in Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri,3 the Supreme Court de-
termined that the Act's purpose was to protect the newly created
national banks from discriminatory state legislatures.4 In light of this
purpose, the Tiffany Court announced what has become known as
the "most favored lender" doctrine by interpreting the NBA to allow
a national bank to borrow the interest rate available to the "most fa-
vored lender" in the state where the national bank is located.5
1. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 727 (1957) (discussing
the National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, §§ 1-65, 12 Stat. 665-82 (1863)). Before the
enactment of the National Currency Act in 1863, the federal government had not estab-
lished a system of federal chartering for banks. Prior to that time only two national banks
had been chartered by the federal government. The first Bank of the United States, char-
tered by Congress in 1791, was the first national bank. However, the bank's charter was
not renewed at the end of the charter's twenty year life. The second Bank of the United
States was established in 1816. Similarly, its charter was allowed to expire after a twenty
year period. See WILLIAM J. BROWN, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES 8-10 (1968).
2. See HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 731. The NBA, as originally worded, stated in
relevant part:
[E]very association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or dis-
count made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidences of debt,
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state or territory where the bank is
located, and no more, except that where by the laws of any state a different rate
is limited for banks of issue organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall
be allowed for associations organized in any such state under this act.
Ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)).
3. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
4. See id. at 412-13.
5. See id. at 413. The Tiffany Court declared that the NBA "allows such [national]
banks to charge such interest as State banks may charge, and more, if by the laws of the
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Over one hundred years later, in Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,6 the Supreme Court ex-
panded the holding of the Tiffany decision to interstate transactions
and held that section 85 of the NBA7 authorizes a national bank to
charge out-of-state credit card customers the highest interest rate al-
lowed by the bank's home state, even when that rate is higher than
the rate permitted by the states in which the cardholders reside.8 The
Marquette decision allows a national bank located in one state to
"export"9 the "most favored lender" rate of the bank's home state to
its customers in other states.
Most recently, in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,' the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether late payment fees
charged to out-of-state credit card customers fall under the term
"interest" in section 85 and thus may be "exported" to out-of-state
customers along with the interest rate.' Deferring to the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency's (the Comptroller) interpretation of the term
"interest" in section 85, the Smiley Court found that late payment
fees constitute "interest" for purposes of section 85.12 Thus, the
Smiley decision enables a national bank to "export" late payment
fees as a form of "interest" from its home state to the states in which
its cardholders reside.
State more may be charged by natural persons." Id Thus, as a result of the Tiffany deci-
sion, the "most favored lender" rate available to a national bank is the greater of the rate
allowed to be charged by state banks or natural persons in the state where the national
bank is located.
6. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
7. Section 85 of the NBA, as amended and codified in the United States Code, reads
in relevant part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest
at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank
is located, or at a rate of [one] per centum in excess of the discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal
reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no
more, except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for
banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for asso-
ciations organized or existing in any such State under title 62 of the Revised
Statutes.
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). This provision was section 30 when the NBA was originally en-
acted in 1864. Section 30 of the NBA was later codified in section 85 of the United States
Code. It is referred to as section 85 of the NBA throughout this Note. See supra note 2
for the original wording of section 30.
8. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 307-19.
9. See id. at 314.
10. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
11. See id. at 1732.
12. See id. at 1736 (affirming the Supreme Court of California).
INTEREST
Part II of this Note will examine the facts, procedural history,
and holding in the Smiley case." Part III will focus on the back-
ground law applicable to the Smiley case and will examine the
decisions of various lower courts regarding whether late payment fees
fall under the term "interest" in section 85,1 Part IV will analyze the
significance of the Smiley case with regard to both national banks and
state-chartered insured banks (state banks).15 Finally, in Part V, this
Note will conclude that state banks, although not directly impacted
by the Smiley decision, should also be allowed to "export" late pay-
ment fees as a form of "interest."16
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Smiley, the petitioner was a resident of California who held
two credit cards issued by respondent, a national bank located in
South Dakota.17 The first card agreement provided for a late fee of
fifteen dollars for each monthly period in which the minimum
monthly payment was not made within twenty-five days of the due
date."' Under the second card agreement, a late fee of six dollars
would be imposed if the minimum monthly payment was not received
within fifteen days of the due date.19 In addition, if the minimum
payment was not received by the next monthly payment due date, the
second card agreement provided for a charge of either fifteen dollars
or 0.65% of the outstanding balance on the card, whichever was
greater.20
After being charged late fees on both credit cards issued by re-
spondent, petitioner filed a class action" suit in California Superior
Court alleging that the late payment fees charged by respondent vio-
lated California law.22 Respondent, Citibank, moved for judgment on
13. See infra notes 17-100 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 101-45 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text. This Note will discuss the Smiley
decision's impact on both national banks and state-chartered insured banks. Because
virtually all state-chartered banks are insured, this Note will simply refer to "state" banks.
16. See infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.




21. "Petitioner ... brought a class action against respondent on behalf of herself and
other California holders of respondent's credit cards, asserting various statutory and
common-law claims." l
22. See id. Petitioner's complaint alleged common-law claims of "breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; fraud and deceit; negligent misrepresenta-
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the pleadings, claiming that petitioner's state law claims were pre-
empted by section 85 of the NBA. 3 The California Superior Court
accepted respondent's argument that credit card late payment fees
constitute "interest" for purposes of section 85 and granted respon-
dent's motion. 4  The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
Superior Court's dismissal of the complaint.5
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeals
and held that "the term 'interest' in section 85 should be construed to
cover late payment fees, if such fees are allowed by a national bank's
home state." ,6 In reaching this conclusion, the court took three de-
liberate steps. First, the court declared that the issue in the case is
not the existence of federal law preemption under section 85, but
rather the scope of the preemption based on the meaning of the term
21"interest" in section 85. Second, after determining that the term
"interest" is not defined in section 85 itselfe or in its predecessor sec-
tion of the NBA as originally enacted in 1864,29 the court looked to
the time of the passage of the NBA to discover a basis for inferring
an implied definition of the term. In doing so, the court found that,
at the time of the passage of the NBA, "the term 'interest' readily
embraced a periodic charge based on a percentage of a certain sum,
tion; and breach of contract." Id. at 1732 n.1. Petitioner's complaint also alleged viola-
tion of the California Business and Professions Code and the California Civil Code. See
id (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1996) ("prohibiting unlawful
business practices"); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (West 1985) ("invalidating unreasonable
liquidated damages")). However, the late payment fees charged by respondent were
legal under South Dakota law, the state where the respondent bank was located. See id
at 1732 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 54-3-1, 54-3-1.1 (1990 and Supp. 1995)).
Thus, if found to constitute "interest" for purposes of section 85, the late fees would be
"exportable" from the bank's home state of South Dakota to California customers under
the Court's holding in Marquette regardless of California law. In contrast, if the late fees
were not found to be "interest" under section 85, the fees would not be part of the
"interest" that was "exportable" to California customers and therefore would violate
California law.
23. See id.
24. See id Initially, the Superior Court denied respondent's motion. See idt How-
ever, the California Court of Appeals "issued a writ of mandate directing the Superior
Court to either grant the motion or show cause why it should not be required to do so."
Id
25. See id (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 26 Cal. App. 4th 1767
(1994)).
26. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 900 P.2d 690,702 (Cal. 1995), affd, 116
S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
27. See id. at 697. The court noted that the Supreme Court, in Marquette, determined
that section 85 preempts state law within its coverage. See id. at 696.
28. See id. at 697.
29. See id. at 698-99 (referring to section 30 of the NBA as enacted in 1864).
30. See id at 699.
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either the amount lent or some other, payable absolutely by matur-
ity."'  However, the court concluded that the term "interest" is not
limited to this meaning and could also include late payment fees,
payable contingently in the event of default, calculated as a "periodic
percentage charge or "fixed as a flat fee."" Finally, determining
that there had not been a change in the coverage of the term
"interest" from the time of the enactment of the NBA in 1864 until it
was later codified in section 85, the court found that the term
"interest" in section 85 should be construed to cover late payment
fees.
Justice Arabian, writing in dissent, rejected the majority's broad
reading of the term "interest" in section 85 . The dissent began by
declaring that the NBA as it was originally enacted did not use the
term "interest" unaccompanied by the word "rate."36 Thus, the dis-
sent stated that "it is highly likely that in enacting section 30,
Congress actually had in its collective mind a much narrower and
more precise understanding [of the term interest] ... a sum linked to
the lending of money calculated at a rate or a percentage of the loan
over time. 3 ' The dissent emphasized that there is nothing in the leg-
islative history of the NBA "to suggest that the drafters of the
measure had anything in mind beyond the common sense, conven-
tional notion of 'rates of interest.' ,38 Furthermore, the dissent
concluded that the Tiffany Court "alluded not to Congress's fear of
the specter of discriminatory rate setting against national banks by
the states, but to its concern that state legislatures might abolish all
31. Id
32. Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Daniels, 1 Greene 179, 188 (Iowa 1848)).
33. Id (citing Craig v. Pleiss, 26 Pa. 271,271-72,272-74 (1856)). The court stated that
one common definition of the term "interest" in use at the time of the passage of the
NBA was a "sum of money paid or allowed by way of compensation for the loan or use of
another sum .... " Id. at 700 (quoting 2 ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A NEW LAW
DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 629 (1851)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
found that another definition was "compensation which is paid by the borrower to the
lender or by the debtor to the creditor for its use." Id. (quoting 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A
LAW DICTIONARY 652 (10th ed. 1860)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under either
definition, the court found that "[s]uch language easily encompasses late payment fees, as
compensation for use of money, specifically, its retention, beyond the loan's term." Id.
34. See id at 701-02. The court noted that its construction of the term "interest" in
section 85 is in accord with the decisions of a majority of other courts, interpretations of
the Comptroller, and the views of commentators. See id. at 702-03.
35. See id at 708-16 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 709 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (referring to section 30 of the NBA as en-
acted in 1864).
37. Id (Arabian, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 710 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
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banks, state and federal."39 Finally, the dissent took the position that
the standard for preemption requires the invalidation of state law
only where the state law prevents a national bank from fulfilling its
governmental duties.4' Under this test, the dissent concluded that the
respondent had failed "to establish that application of California's
ban on late charge fees unrelated to actual damages will in any sense
'incapacitate' it from carrying out its duties as a federal instrumen-
tality.
, 41
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice George stated that the
majority "failed to recognize the clear distinction that traditionally
has been drawn between such late payment charges and charges that
commonly are characterized as 'interest.' ,42 The dissent maintained
that late payment fees are assessed only if the borrower fails to make
a timely payment and thus are "penalties" or "liquidated damages. 43
Moreover, the dissent determined that conditional late payment fees
traditionally were regarded as penalties for nonperformance of the
loan agreement, rather than "interest" on the loan itself.44  After
finding that nothing in the legislative history of the NBA suggests
that the statutory reference to "interest" includes late fees, the dis-
sent relied on cases at the time of the enactment of the NBA in 1864
that made it clear that late fees "would not be considered interest for
the purpose of determinin whether the loan exceeded the legally
permitted rate of interest." 5 Finally, the dissent rejected the major-
ity's conclusion "that the term 'interest' in section 85 must be given
an unusually broad interpretation, encompassing late paym ent fees,
in order to effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute."
4 1
39. IdL at 711 (Arabian, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that "[ilt was thus to
induce state banks to convert their charters and to protect the future of banking itself,
that Congress tied national bank interest rate ceilings to those set by local legislatures for
lenders other than state banks." Id. at 712 (Arabian, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dis-
sent also emphasized that neither the Marquette Court nor Congress "wrote or legislated
against a backdrop of interstate banking, an arrangement that did not exist even in 1978
and was inconceivable in 1864." Id. at 713 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 715 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 716 (George, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 717-18 (George, J., dissenting) (citing Garrett v. Coast S. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 511 P.2d 1197 (1973)).
44. See idL at 718 (George, J., dissenting) (citing First Am. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Cook, 12 Cal. App. 3d 592,596-97 (1970)).
45. Id. (George, J., dissenting) (citing Spain v. Hamilton's Adm'r, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
604, 626 (1863)).
46. Id. at 719 (George, J., dissenting).
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Recognizing disagreement not only within the California Su-
preme Court,47 but also among various lower courts as to the proper
interpretation of the term "interest" in section 85,48 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous
Court, began the Court's analysis by declaring that it would be diffi-
cult to contend that the term "interest" in section 85 is unambiguous
with regard to whether the statutory term encompasses late payment
fees?° The Court stated that it declared, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.," that it was the Court's
"practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of agencies with re-
gard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are
charged with administering. 5 2 The Court noted "that [the] practice
extends to the judgments of the Comptroller of the Currency with
regard to the meaning of the banking laws."53 Adhering to the ordi-
nary rule of deference to agency judgments, the Court looked to a
regulation adopted by the Comptroller in February of 1996e which
includes late payment fees within the definition of "interest" in sec-
tion 85."
47. See supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 115-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two com-
peting views of various lower courts prior to the Smiley decision.
49. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (1996).
50. See id. at 1732-33.
51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52. Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1733 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-45 (1984)).
53. Id
54. Although the Comptroller's regulation was in effect at the time of the Court's
decision, the Comptroller's final regulation was enacted after the California Supreme
Court's decision. See icL However, in March of 1995, the Comptroller noticed for public
comment a proposed regulation dealing with the subject of late payment fees. See id
This proposed regulation was issued after the California Superior Court's decision but
prior to the California Supreme Court's decision. See id.
55. See id. The Comptroller's regulation reads:
The term "interest" as used in 12 U.S.C. § 85 includes any payment compensat-
ing a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit, making available
of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon
which credit was extended. It includes, among other things, the following fees
connected with credit extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late
fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance
fees, and membership fees. It does not ordinarily include appraisal fees, premi-
ums and commissions attributable to insurance guaranteeing repayment of any
extension of credit, finders' fees, fees for document preparation or notarization,
or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.
61 Fed. Reg. 4869 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)).
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The petitioner proposed several reasons why the ordinary rule of
deference should not apply to this regulation by the Comptroller: (1)
the regulation was issued over one hundred years after the original
enactment of the NBA;56 (2) the regulation does not provide a ra-
tional basis for distinguishing the charges it denominates "interest"
from those it denominates "noninterest;" 57 and (3) the regulation is
"inconsistent with positions taken by the Comptroller in the past."
58
Addressing petitioner's first argument, the Court declared that
the more than one hundred year delay between the enactment of the
NBA and the adoption of the Comptroller's regulation does not af-
fect the validity of the regulation. 9 The Court noted that it does not
accord deference to agencies "because of a presumption that they
drafted the provisions in question, or were present at the hearings, or
spoke to the principal sponsors .... "60 Rather, the Court stated that
agencies are given deference "because of a presumption that Con-
gress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by
an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity al-
lows."61 Although the Court acknowledged that it would deny
deference "to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported
by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice,"6 2 the Court found
that the regulation in question is a final regulation issued by the
Comptroller and "adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment pro-
cedures of the Administrative Procedure Act designed to assure due
deliberation."63
56. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1733.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 1734.
59. See id. at 1733 (declaring that "agency interpretations that are of long standing
come before us with a certain credential of reasonableness, since it is rare that error
would long persist" and that "neither antiquity nor contemporaneity with the statute is a
condition of validity").
60. Id
61. ld. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837,843-44 (1984)).
62. ML (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994)). Along with the delay between the enactment of
the NBA and the adoption of the Comptroller's regulation, petitioner argued that the
regulation should not be given deference because it was adopted "seemingly as a result of
this and similar litigation in which the Comptroller has participated as amicus curiae on
the side of the banks." Id. The Court dismissed this argument by stating "[t]hat it was
litigation which disclosed the need for the regulation is irrelevant." Id.
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The Court next addressed petitioner's argument that the Comp-
troller's regulation does not provide a rational basis for distinguishing
between charges it denominates "interest" from those it denominates
"noninterest." 64 The Court found that it was rational for the regula-
tion to distinguish between payments relating to the extension of
credit, the availability of a line of credit, or any default by a borrower
and all other payments.6 Thus, the Court concluded that the line
drawn by the Comptroller's regulation is reasonable.6
After rejecting petitioner's first two arguments, the Court ad-
dressed petitioner's argument that the Comptroller's regulation is
"inconsistent with positions taken by the Comptroller in the past."67
In response, the Court noted that "the mere fact that an agency in-
terpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal."6
However, the Court acknowledged that a "[s]udden and unexplained
change"69 or "change that does not take account of legitimate reli-
ance on prior interpretation, 70 may be "arbitrary, capricious [or] an
abuse of discretion., 71 Nevertheless, the Court found that a change in
official agency position has not occurred in the present case.7 The
Court stated that petitioner relied on statements in two letters as evi-
dence of a prior agency position that late payment fees do not
constitute "interest" for purposes of section 85.7 After determining
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1734. The Comptroller's regulation specifically states that the term
"interest" in section 85 includes "any payment compensating a creditor or prospective
creditor for an extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or
breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was extended." 61 Fed. Reg. 4869
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)).
66. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1734. The Court reserved the question of whether the
regulation is "'arbitrary [or] capricious' as an interpretation of what the statute means-
or perhaps even (what Chevron also excludes from deference) 'manifestly contrary to the
statute' "for a later segment of the opinion. Id. (alteration in original); see infra notes 84-
93 and accompanying text.
67. Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1734.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,46-57 (1983)).
70. ld (citing United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670-75
(1973)).
71. Id (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
72. See id. The Court noted that the Statement of Basis and Purpose accompanying
the Comptroller's final regulation states that the "final ruling is consistent with OCC in-
terpretive letters in this area ... and reflects the position the OCC has taken in amicus
curiae briefs in litigation pending in many state and Federal courts." Idt (alteration in
original) (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 4859 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. See id First, petitioner relied on a letter from the Comptroller to the President's
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that neither of the letters is "sufficient in and of itself to establish a
binding agency policy," 74 the Court found that the two statements
taken together do not reflect a prior agency policy because they con-
tradict each other.75 Indeed, the Court declared that the statements
relied on by the petitioner show, if anything, that "there was good
reason for the Comptroller to promulgate the new regulation, in or-
der to eliminate uncertainty and confusion."76
After rejecting all of petitioner's arguments that the Comptrol-
ler's specific regulation interpreting section 85 should not be
accorded the usual deference, the Court addressed petitioner's argu-
ment that no Comptroller interpretation of section 85 is entitled to
deference because section 85 preempts state law 7 Specifically, peti-
tioner argued that the Court previously announced a "presumption
against... pre-emption 7 8 which should, in effect, trump the ordinary
Chevron deference. 79 Rejecting petitioner's argument that this pre-
sumption trumps the ordinary practice of deferring to the judgment
of agencies, 8 the Court stated that "[tihis argument confuses the
question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a
statute with the question of whether a statute is pre-emptive."'" The
Court declared that "there is no doubt that § 85 pre-empts state
law."' 2 Rather, the Court emphasized that the issue in the case is
Committee on Consumer Interests written in 1964 which states that late payment fees are
not properly characterized as "interest." See id Second, petitioner relied on a 1988
opinion letter from the Deputy Chief Counsel of the OCC stating "it is my position that
[under § 85] the laws of the states where the banks are located ... determine whether or
not the banks can impose the foregoing fees and charges [including late fees] on Iowa
residents." Id (alterations in original) (quoting OCC Interpretive Letter No. 452, [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) '1 85,676, at 78,064 (Aug. 11, 1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id The Court noted that the first statement was too informal to establish a
binding agency policy and that the second statement "only purported to represent the
position of the Deputy Chief Counsel in response to an inquiry concerning particular
banks." Id.
75. See id (stating that the first letter asserts that "interest" is a nationally uniform
concept and that the second letter asserts that "interest" is to be determined by reference
to state law).
76. Id. at 1734-35.
77. See id. at 1735.
78. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
518 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See id.
80. See id. Petitioner argued that the presumption against preemption "requires a
court to make its own interpretation of § 85 that will avoid (to the extent possible) pre-




simply the meaning of section 85.?
In the final segment of the opinion, the Court addressed the
question of whether the Comptroller's regulation represents a rea-
sonable interpretation of section 85.4 Looking to the definition of
"interest" in legal dictionaries at the time the NBA was originally
enacted" and the Court's own definition of "interest" pronounced
shortly after the enactment of the NBA," the Court rejected peti-
tioner's argument that late fees do not constitute "interest" because
they are not based on the amount outstanding on the loan.?7 The
Court also dismissed petitioner's argument that the language in sec-
tion 85 "at the rate allowed"" requires "that the interest charges be
expressed as functions of time and amount owing." 89 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court stated that "[a]ny flat charge may, of course,
readily be converted to a percentage charge" 9 and that "there is no
apparent reason why home-state approved percentage charges should
be permissible but home-state-approved flat charges unlawful." 91
Moreover, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that late fees
cannot be "interest" because they are "penalties" by declaring that
"[i]n § 85, the term 'interest' is not used in contradistinction to
'penalty,' and there is no reason why it cannot include interest
charges imposed for that purpose." 2 Thus, the Court determined
that the Comptroller's regulation is reasonable.9
83. See id
84. See id. The Court specifically noted that the question is whether the regulation is
a reasonable interpretation of the statute and not whether it is the best interpretation.
See id.
85. See i&t The Court stated that a common definition of "interest" at the time of the
enactment of the NBA was the "compensation which is paid by the borrower to the
lender or by the debtor to the creditor for ... use [of money]." ld. (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DIcTIONARY 652 (6th ed. 1856)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
86. See ii. The Court's own definition of "interest" was "the compensation allowed
by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money or as damages for its
detention." Id. (quoting Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1872)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
87. See id.
88. See supra note 7 for the language of section 85.
89. Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1736.
90. Itt (noting that the fact that any flat charge may be converted into a percentage
charge was the basis for nineteenth century decisions holding that flat charges violated
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In summary, the Smiley Court found that the Comptroller's
regulation interpreting section 85 is entitled to deference under the
Court's holding in Chevron.94 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
rejected petitioner's arguments that the Comptroller's regulation is
not entitled to deference because it was issued over one hundred
years after the NBA was enacted,95 the regulation does not provide a
rational basis for distinguishing the various charges it denominates
"interest" and "noninterest,"9 and the regulation is inconsistent with
positions taken by the Comptroller in the past.97 The Court also dis-
missed petitioner's argument that no Comptroller interpretation of
section 85 should be entitled to deference because section 85 pre-
empts state law and there is a presumption against preemption.9"
After determining that the Comptroller's regulation is entitled to
deference under Chevron, the Court found that the regulation is a
reasonable interpretation of section 85. 9 Thus, the Court reached its
ultimate conclusion that the term "interest" in section 85 includes
late payment fees."o
III. BACKGROUND LAW
The Supreme Court's analysis of the term "interest" in Smiley is
not the Court's first interpretation of the term "interest" under the
banking laws. Over one hundred and twenty years earlier, the Court,
in Tiffany, first construed the NBA' °1 and announced what has be-
come known as the "most favored lender" doctrine. The Tiffany
Court determined that Congress enacted the NBA to protect the
newly created national banks from unfair treatment by state legisla-
tures1 0 in order to achieve a centralized national banking system.'O3
94. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
100. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (1996)
(affirming the Supreme Court of California).
101. The Tiffany Court construed section 30 of the NBA. Section 30 was later codified
in section 85 of the United States Code also under the title of the NBA. The Smile)
Court construed section 85. For the wording of section 30, see supra note 2, and for the
wording of section 85, see supra note 7.
102. The Tiffany Court stated:
It cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose of Congress in providing for the or-
ganization of National banking associations, that it was intended to give them a
firm footing in the different States where they might be located. It was expected
they would come into competition with State banks, and it was intended to give
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After declaring that the NBA gives "advantages to National banks
over their State competitors, ' 14 the Court found that the Act allows
national banks "to charge such interest as State banks may charge,
and more, if by the laws of the State more may be charged by natural
persons." ' Thus, the Tiffany Court allowed a national bank located
in Missouri to charge the same interest rate as chargeable by natural
persons under Missouri law while Missouri state banks were limited
to a lower rate under Missouri law.'
Over one hundred years later, the Marquette Court expanded the
reach of the "most favored lender" doctrine107 to interstate transac-
tions by announcing what has become known as the interest
"exportation '108 principle. Construing the language of section 85,'09
the Marquette Court held that a national bank is allowed to charge
credit card customers in other states the interest rate authorized by
the state where the bank is "located, 110 even when that rate is higher
them at least equal advantages in such competition. In order to accomplish this
they were empowered to reserve interest at the same rates, whatever those rates
might be, which were allowed to similar State institutions. This was considered
indispensable to protect them against possible unfriendly State legislation. Ob-
viously, if State statutes should allow to their banks of issue a rate of interest
greater than the ordinary rate allowed to natural persons, National banking as-
sociations could not compete with them, unless allowed the same. On the other
hand, if such associations were restricted to the rates allowed by the statutes of
the State to banks which might be authorized by the State laws, unfriendly leg-
islation might make their existence in the State impossible.
Tiffany v. National Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409,412-13 (1873).
103. See id. at 413 (declaring that national banks "were established for the purpose, in
part, of providing a currency for the whole country, and in part to create a market for the
loans of the General government").
104. Id.
105. IL
106. See id. at 410. Under Missouri law, banks organized under its state laws were
limited to eight percent interest, but the rate of interest allowed generally was ten per-
cent. See ic In Tiffany, the national bank located in Missouri charged nine percent. See
id.
107. The Marquette Court implicitly reaffirmed the "most favored lender" doctrine by
citing Tiffany with approval. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 (1978). Furthermore, the Marquette Court stated that
"[t]he 'most favored lender' status for national banks under Tiffany has since been incor-
porated into the regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency." Id at 314 n.26 (citing
12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1978)).
108. See id. at 314.
109. See supra note 7 for the language of section 85.
110. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 309 n.21. The Court declared that, for purposes of
section 85, "a national bank is 'located' either in the place designated in its 'organization
certificate,' ... or in the places in which it has established authorized branches." Id.
(citation omitted) (citing Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977)).
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than the rate permitted by the states in which the customers reside."'
In Marquette, the Court allowed a national bank located in Nebraska
to charge its Minnesota credit card customers an interest rate that
was allowed under Nebraska law, but was higher than the rate al-
112lowed by Minnesota usury laws. Furthermore, the Marquette Court
expressly rejected petitioner's argument that the "exportation" of
interest rates would "significantly impair the ability of States to enact
effective usury laws' ' " and declared that "the protection of state
usury laws is an issue of legislative policy, and any plea to alter § 85
to further that end is better addressed to the wisdom of Congress
than to the judgment of this Court. 11 4 Thus, the Marquette decision,
combined with the Tiffany decision, allows a national bank to
"export" the "most favored lender" rate of the bank's home state to
its customers in other states.
Prior to the Court's decision in Smiley, various lower courts
disagreed on whether the term "interest" in section 85 should be in-
terpreted to include late payment fees."' The two main approaches
that emerged from the lower courts can be described as the "broad
view" and the "narrow view."" 6 The "broad view" generally empha-
sized the enabling, rather than restrictive, nature of section 85 in
determining that the term "interest" in section 85 should be read
117broadly to include late payment fees. In contrast, the "narrow
view" focused on interpreting the term "interest" to only include per-
centage charges based on outstanding balances."' The Smiley courtfollowed the "broad view" in holding that late payment fees consti-
111. See iL at 307-19. As a result of the Marquette decision, a bank in State A can
override the intent of the legislature in State B to protect its citizens from usurious inter-
est rates. For example, suppose State A does not have an interest rate ceiling while State
B imposes an eighteen percent limit. Banks located in State A can extend credit to cus-
tomers residing in State B utilizing an unlimited interest rate authorized by the laws of
State A. Residents of State B would be protected by State B's eighteen percent interest
rate cap only if they received credit from a bank located in State B.
112. See id. at 302. Nebraska law permitted banks to charge interest on the unpaid
balances of credit card accounts at the rate of eighteen percent per year on the first
$999.99 and twelve percent per year on amounts over $1,000. See id. However, Minne-
sota law fixed the annual interest rate at twelve percent but allowed banks to compensate
by charging annual fees of up to fifteen dollars for the privilege of using a bank credit
card. See id. at 302-03.
113. Id. at 318 (stating that "[tihis impairment, however, has always been implicit in
the structure of the National Bank Act ").
114. Id. at 319.
115. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
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tute "interest" for purposes of section 85.119
In Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N.A.,"2 the Colorado Su-
preme Court followed the "broad view" and held that a national
bank located in Delaware was permitted to charge a Colorado credit
card customer "interest" in the form of late payment fees, which were
valid under Delaware law, under its authority from section 85 despite
121the fact that Colorado law prohibited such fees. In Copeland, a
Colorado credit card customer initiated a class action suit against a
national bank located in Delaware and alleged that the bank violated
Colorado law by charging late fees in addition to finance charges on
his credit card account.122 The court reasoned that late payment fees
constitute "interest" under section 85 based on a number of reasons.
First, the court found sufficient authority to allow it "to conclude that
a form of late payment fees was included in the definition of the term
'interest' at the time the NBA was enacted."'123 Second, the court
gave "deference to the various OCC administrative opinions and
rulings interpreting late payment fees as a form of 'interest' under
section 85 of the NBA."4 Third, the court found that Congress' en-
actment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
119. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
120. 907 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1995), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 2496 (1996).
121. See id. at 89. In addition to the Colorado Supreme Court, other courts followed
the "broad" view in dealing with the question of credit card late fees under section 85.
However, the Smiley Court specifically cited the Copeland case as one of the principal
reasons for granting certiorari. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct.
1730, 1732 n.2 (1996).
122 See Copeland, 907 P.2d at 88-89. The card agreement provided for a fifteen dollar
late fee if the minimum payment was not paid within twenty-five days of the due date.
See id. at 89. Failing to make a minimum monthly payment, petitioner was assessed a
fifteen dollar late fee. See id.
123. lit at 92 (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986)). Before
looking to the definition of "interest" at the time the NBA was enacted, the court consid-
ered three things: (1) the statutory language of section 85; (2) the legislative history of
the NBA; and (3) court interpretations of section 85. See id. at 90-92. The court found
that neither section 85 nor the legislative history of the NBA defines the term "interest."
See id. at 90-91. Further, the court found that other courts adopted an expansive view of
the term "interest" to include banking charges other than periodic percentage interest
rates. See id. at 92.
In reaching its determination that late payment fees constitute "interest" for pur-
poses of section 85, the Smiley Court also looked to the definition of the term "interest"
at the time of the enactment of the NBA. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
124. Copeland, 907 P.2d at 92 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.7378 (1971)). Similarly, the Smiley
Court gave great deference to a regulation by the Comptroller that interprets the term
"interest" found in section 85 to include late payment fees. See supra notes 47-93 and
accompanying text.
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Control Act (the DIDMCA) of 1980,"z which incorporated the lan-
guage of section 85, lent support to finding that late payment fees
constitute "interest" for purposes of section 85."6 Finally, the
Copeland court was persuaded by the majority of other courts that
interpreted late payment fees to be a form of "interest" under both
section 85 for national banks and section 1831d for state banks.27
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Sherman v.
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,'2 followed the "narrow view" by
holding that late payment fees do not constitute "interest" under sec-
tion 85.129 In reaching this conclusion, the Sherman court began its
analysis by declaring that "[w]here the field that Congress is said to
have preempted has been traditionally occupied by the states, 'we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless there was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' 3' Finding that state usury
law restrictions were historically rooted in the consumer protection
field traditionally occupied by the states, the court determined that
Congress' failure to include an express preemption clause in section
85 necessitates an examination of whether section 85 conflicts with
New Jersey state law prohibiting late fees. 31
In conducting its examination of whether section 85 conflicts
with New Jersey state law, the Sherman court took several deliberate
steps. First, the court rejected the notion that at the time of the en-
actment of the NBA "Congress contemplated an open-ended and
expansive concept of interest that was light years from the traditional
understanding of a fixed, basic percentage rate applied to an unpaid
loan balance."'32 Second, the Sherman court dismissed the reasoning
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1994) [hereinafter all references to § 521 of the DIDMCA will
be to 12 U.S.C. § 1831d ].
126. See Copeland, 907 P.2d at 92-93 ("We believe that had Congress intended to de-
fine 'interest' with a narrow definition of numerical periodic percentage rates, it would
have provided that definition in section 521 of the DID[MC]A.").
127. See id. at 93 (citing Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1992)).
128. 668 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2493 (1996) (remanding the case to
the New Jersey Supreme Court to reconsider in light of the Smiley decision). In addition
to the New Jersey Supreme Court, other courts held that credit card late fees do not fall
within the term "interest" in section 85. However, the Smiley Court specifically cited the
Sherman case as one of the principal reasons for granting certiorari. See Smiley v. Citi-
bank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 n.2 (1996).
129. See Sherman, 668 A.2d at 1040.
130. Id. at 1041 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 1044. The Sherman court looked to the legislative history of section 521 of
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of other courts that interpreted the term "interest" broadly.133 Third,
the court rejected the proposed interpretive ruling of the Comptrol-
ler as evidence that late fees should be included in the term "interest"
for purposes of section 85 because the court found that the Comp-
troller had failed to adopt a consistent interpretation in administering
section 85."3 Finally, the Sherman court determined that neither
Congress, in enacting the NBA, nor the New Jersey legislature, in
passing its own State Bank Parity Act, "intended to include late fees
in its definition of interest for the purpose of preventing discrimina-
tion against out-of-state lenders."'35 Therefore, the Sherman court
determined that the term "interest" in section 85 refers "only to the
periodic percentage rate charged on outstanding balances.""'6 Thus,
the court concluded that "plaintiff's state-law defenses to the bank's
charges do not conflict with federal law, are not preempted, and the
late-payment fees are illegal under New Jersey law."' 37
In summary, the Court has traditionally found the provisions in
section 85 and its predecessor, section 30 of the NBA as originally
enacted, to be enabling rather than restrictive for national banks.
The Tiffany Court, in 1873, interpreted the NBA to allow a national
the DIDMCA (section 1831d) which uses language similar to that used in section 85 to
support its conclusion that Congress' focus was on periodic interest rates. See id at 1042-
44. The Sherman court declared that "[i]f we cannot attribute to legislative initiative of
15 years ago [the enactment of the DIDMCA] the intent to include discrete, specialized
charges within a definition of interest, we cannot ascribe that expansive definition to a
legislative initiative that occurred over 100 years earlier." Id. at 1044.
133. See id. (stating that the cases are "unpersuasive and do not support the conclusion
that Congress intended to include non-interest rate charges in its understanding of inter-
est").
134. See id. at 1046-48.
135. Id. at 1051. The Sherman court also rejected the argument that out-of-state na-
tional banks should be permitted to charge late fees because New Jersey credit unions
were permitted to charge late fees under New Jersey state law. See id. at 1051-53.
136. Id. at 1040. Similarly, the petitioner in the Smiley case argued that late payment
fees do not constitute "interest" because they do not vary based on the payment owed
and are not expressed as functions of time. The Smiley court rejected these arguments.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
137. Sherman, 668 A.2d at 1040. In a strong dissent, Justice Pollock criticized the ma-
jority's "cavalier dismissal" of the Comptroller's proposed ruling. See id. at 1060
(Pollock, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent determined that the term "interest" in
section 85 includes late fees. See id (Pollock, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Pollock con-
cluded that section 85 of the NBA conflicts with and preempts New Jersey state law
prohibiting out-of-state national banks from charging late fees. See id. at 1063 (Pollock,
J., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice O'Hern agreed with the majority
that section 85 of the NBA does not preempt state consumer protection laws prohibiting
late fees. See id. at 1064 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). However, Justice O'Hern concluded
that national banks should be allowed to assess late fees because New Jersey law permit-
ted state lenders to assess such fees and the state could not discriminate against national
banks seeking to impose the same charges. See id (O'Hem, J., dissenting).
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bank to borrow the interest rate available to the "most favored
lender" in the state where the national bank is located.138 Thus, after
the Tiffany decision, a national bank is authorized to charge the in-
terest rate allowed to be charged by state banks in the state where the
national bank is located or more if the state law allows more to be
charged by natural persons.139 Over one hundred years later, the
Marquette Court held that section 85 authorizes a national bank to
charge out-of-state credit card customers the interest rate allowed by
the bank's home state, even when that rate is higher than the rate
permitted by the states in which the cardholders reside.'4° The Mar-
quette decision, combined with the Tiffany decision, allows a national
bank to "export" the "most favored lender" rate of the bank's home
state to credit card customers in other states. 41 Prior to the Smiley
Court's decision, the lower courts were divided on the issue of
whether the term "interest" in section 85 should be interpreted to
include late payment fees.1 Some courts adopted a "broad view" of
the term "interest" in section 85 and interpreted the term to include
nonpercentage charges such as late payment fees.'43 In contrast,
other courts adopted a "narrow view" of the term "interest" in sec-
tion 85 and construed the term to be limited to percentage charges
based on outstanding balances.' 44 The Smiley Court followed the
"broad view" when it held that late payment fees constitute
"interest" for purposes of section 85.145
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE
The unanimous Smiley decision settled the issue of late payment
fee "exportation" for national banks and eliminated the "narrow
view" in favor of the "broad view." As a result of the Smiley deci-
sion, a national bank will be permitted to "export" late payment fees
allowed by its home state to its customers who are residents of other
states under the Court's holding in Marquette.14 Additionally, the
Smiley decision opens the door to three potential consequences: (1)
138. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 115-37 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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the exportation of additional fees as "interest" under section 85;147 (2)
the continued evisceration of consumer protection usury laws;'48 and
(3) the discrimination against state banks which are not directly im-
pacted by the Court's holding in Smiley. 49
Addressing the first potential consequence of the Smiley deci-
sion, the significance of the Smiley Court's holding on other fees
listed as "interest" in the Comptroller's regulation is not directly set-
tled."" However, the Smiley decision shows that the Court is willing
to give great deference to the Comptroller's interpretation of the
banking laws in this area.151 The Comptroller's regulation, relied on
by the Smiley Court in reaching its decision, included the following
fees within the term "interest" for purposes of section 85: "numerical
periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, overlimit
fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees."' 2 Thus,
it is highly likely that the Court will give the same deference to the
Comptroller's regulation for the other fees listed in the regulation as
"interest" as it did for late payment fees in the Smiley decision. As a
result, a national bank will probably be able to "export" the other
fees listed in the Comptroller's regulation as "interest," if allowed by
the bank's home state, to its customers in other states.
The status of fees not expressly listed in the Comptroller's regu-
lation as falling under the term "interest" in section 85 is not clear.
However, the regulation specifically states that the term "interest"
includes "any payment compensating a creditor or prospective credi-
tor for an extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or
any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit
was extended."'53 Furthermore, the regulation states that the term
"interest" includes the fees expressly listed "among other things."'"
These facts leave an opening for an extremely broad interpretation of
the term "interest" in section 85 to include many fees not expressly
listed as "interest" in the regulation. Under the Comptroller's ar-
guably broad definition of "interest" in the regulation, it will
probably be difficult for plaintiffs to distinguish other fees as not fal-
147. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
150. The Smiley decision related only to late payment fees. See supra notes 47-93 and
accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
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ling under the term "interest" in section 85.155 Consequently, the
Smiley Court's deference to the Comptroller's regulation regarding
late payment fees will probably result in most other fees being
"exportable" to customers in other states.56
Regarding the second potential consequence of the Smiley deci-
sion, the Smiley Court's holding that late payment fees are
"exportable" as "interest" under section 85 will potentially continue
the evisceration of consumer protection usury laws that began with
the Court's holding in Marquette.15 ' The Marquette decision, which
held that a national bank may "export" the interest rate allowed by
its home state to customers in other states, has "enabled banks to
conduct their nationwide consumer-credit transactions from very fa-
vorable environments."158 Moreover, the Marquette decision has also
put pressure on the legislatures of states with stricter usury laws "to
repeal or relax their own interest-rate limits in response to threats by
banks to move their credit-card operations elsewhere. 1 59 The Smiley
155. The Comptroller's regulation expressly states that the term "interest" does not
ordinarily include "appraisal fees, premiums and commissions attributable to insurance
guaranteeing repayment of any extension of credit, finders' fees, fees for document
preparation or notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports." 61 Fed. Reg. 4869
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)). For a fee not expressly included in the
regulation as either "interest" or "noninterest," plaintiffs could possibly argue that the fee
is more analogous to the fees specifically denominated as "noninterest" than those de-
nominated as "interest" in the regulation.
156. This would be the probable result as long as the fees to be "exported" are not
expressly listed as "noninterest" in the Comptroller's regulation. See supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
157. See generally Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal
Controls on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1996) (discussing the lack
of interest rate controls and concluding that interest rate controls should be reinstated).
158. Kevin G. Toh, Are Credit-Card Late Fees "Interest"? Delineating the Preemptive
Reach of Section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864 and Section 521 of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1294, 1296
(1996). In the early 1980s, many banks moved their credit card operations to a few states,
such as Delaware, Nebraska, and South Dakota, that "had raised or removed interest-rate
ceilings and relaxed other consumer-credit-protection laws in order to attract banks and
thereby generate revenues." Id.
159. Id; see, e.g., Tony Munroe, Virginia Law Change Attracts Credit Card Companies,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at Cl; see also David Conn, Key Federal Shifting Credit Card
Unit to Delaware Official Blames Md. Restrictions, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 16, 1993, at
9C. According to a 1993 study by DRI/McGraw-Hill, the top ten "credit card friendly"
states for banks were: South Dakota, Nebraska, Delaware, Utah, Florida, Arizona, Vir-
ginia, Nevada, Ohio, and Georgia. See Nicholas Towasser, South Dakota Rated Tops for
Card Banks Its Costs, Regulations, Quality of Life Get High Marks in Survey, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 5, 1993, at 7.
The tension can be seen in North Carolina which sets an eighteen percent interest
rate cap and a twenty-four dollar annual fee limit for revolving credit charges. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-11 (Supp. 1996). In addition, North Carolina imposes a limit of either
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Court's holding, that late payment fees are also "exportable" as
"interest" under Marquette, further enhances the ability of "a few
states with the weakest consumer-protection laws ... [to] veto the
consumer-protection laws of other states and dictate the terms by
which consumers in all fifty states buy credit."'
1
Turning to the third potential consequence of the Smiley deci-
sion, state banks could potentially be discriminated against if they are
not given the same ability to "export" late payment fees that was ac-
corded national banks in the Smiley decision.'' The principal basis
for the Smiley Court's ruling, that the Comptroller's interpretation of
section 85 is entitled to deference, has no direct impact on state
banks for two reasons. First, state banks are not regulated by the
Comptroller but rather by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC). Second, the statute in question in Smiley, section 85,
which details the amount of "interest" a national bank may charge,
does not apply to state banks. Rather, the amount of "interest" state
banks may charge is included in section 1831d.16
Although the Smiley decision does not have a direct bearing on
state banks, the principle of Smiley, that late payment fees constitute
five dollars or ten dollars on late fees, depending on the amount of the outstanding bal-
ance. See id. As a result, the three largest banks headquartered in North Carolina
(NationsBank, First Union, and Wachovia) have their credit card operations in less regu-
lated states in order to avoid these restrictions. See John Cochran, State's Consumers May
Face Interest Hike, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., May 23, 1996, at Al. In 1996, the legis-
lature was to consider a proposal to relax the interest rate cap and fee limits. See id.
However, the bill was pulled from the calendar for further study. See John Cochran,
House to Study Banking Reforms, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., May 29, 1996, at Bi. In
December 1996, another large North Carolina bank, First Citizens, announced that it was
moving its credit card unit to Virginia in order to take advantage of that state's more
flexible usury laws. See Joel B. Obermayer, First Citizens Moving Unit, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Dec. 14, 1996, at Dl. Commenting on the announcement, the executive vice
president of the Community Bankers Association of North Carolina stated that it is "very
difficult to run a credit card operation here ... [because we have] a fairly rigid structure
in North Carolina. Not that it's an unreasonable one.... It just doesn't provide the flexi-
bility that the marketplace demands." Id.
160. Toh, supra note 158, at 1296.
161. Similar to the division of opinion among various lower courts regarding late fees
for national banks under section 85 prior to the Smiley decision, lower courts were di-
vided as to whether late fees constitute "interest" for state banks under section 1831d of
the United States Code. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 776 F. Supp. 21 (D.
Mass. 1991), rev'd, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992); Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co., 668 A.2d
1067 (N.J. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2493 (1996) (remanding the case to the New Jersey
Supreme Court).
162. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
163. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994). In a note to section 1831d, states were granted
the ability to "opt-out" of section 1831d's preemption of their laws. A complete discus-
sion of this "opt-out" provision is beyond the scope of this Note.
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"exportable interest," probably will apply to state banks for several
reasons: (1) the express purpose of section 1831d is "to prevent dis-
crimination against State-chartered insured depository
institutions;"' 64 (2) the language of section 1831d closely mirrors the
language of section 85;165 and (3) the FDIC legal staff interprets sec-
tion 1831d to include late payment fees as "exportable interest" for
state banks.66
First, national banks no longer need the favorable treatment
over state banks that was necessary at the time of the enactment of
the NBA. After determining that the NBA was enacted to provide a
currency for the country and to create a market for the loans of the
federal government, the Tiffany Court held that national banks are
entitled to favorable treatment over state banks.' 67 However, while
national banks may have originally needed extra protection from
state legislatures and therefore were entitled to favorable treatment
over state banks, Congress itself recognized that the times had
changed and expressly stated that the purpose of section 1831d is "to
prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository
institutions .... ,,168
Second, because the language of section 1831d closely mirrors
the language of section 85,"9 the term "interest" in section 1831d
should be interpreted for state banks the same as the term "interest"
in section 85 is interpreted for national banks. The Supreme Court
164. Id.; see infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
168. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
169. Section 1831d(a) reads:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository in-
stitutions, including insured savings banks, or insured branches of foreign banks
with respect to interest rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in this subsection
exceeds the rate such State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be
permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or such in-
sured branch of a foreign bank may, notwithstanding any State constitution or
statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive,
reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of ex-
change, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than [one] per
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect
at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State
bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank is located or at the rate allowed
by the laws of the State, territory, or district where the bank is located, which-
ever may be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a). One main difference in the wording of section 1831d as compared
to section 85 is that section 1831d expressly preempts state law. See supra note 7 for the
language of section 85 that applies to national banks.
itself declared that when a statute adopts words from an older stat-
ute, the language of the two statutes should be interpreted the same
way."7 Furthermore, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
"Bank Act [NBA] precedents must inform our interpretation of
words and phrases that were lifted from the [Nationall Bank Act and
inserted into DID[MC]A's [section 1831d] text."'17  The Smiley
holding, that late payment fees constitute "interest" under section 85
for national banks, can reasonably be viewed as a "[National] Bank
Act precedent" that should be used to interpret the similar language
of section 1831d for state banks.
Finally, the FDIC legal staff interprets section 1831d to include
late payment fees as "exportable interest" for state banks. In the
Smiley case, the Court gave great deference to the Comptroller's
regulation that interprets the term "interest" in section 85 to include
late payment fees because it is a regulation adopted pursuant to the
proper notice-and-comment procedures.' 72 Unlike the Comptroller,
the FDIC has not issued a regulation regarding whether late payment
fees constitute "exportable interest" for purposes of section 1831d.
However, the FDIC has issued an Advisory Opinion on whether late
payment fees are "exportable" for state banks. Indeed, in 1992, the
FDIC Deputy General Counsel stated that "the FDIC consistently
has interpreted Section 521 [1831d] to provide state-chartered banks
with the same most favored lender status and right to export interest
enjoyed by national banks under Section 85."'" The Advisory
Opinion further stated that insured state banks are authorized to
charge the "most favored lender" rate of the state where the bank is
chartered and "[t]hat authorization necessarily includes the right to
charge late fees and other charges permitted by the bank's home
state which are either a component of interest or material to the de-
termination of the interest rate.' 74 Although the Advisory Opinion
of the FDIC legal staff should not be given the same degree of defer-
ence as the Comptroller's regulation in Smiley, it can reasonably be
regarded as the administrative practice of the agency which is ac-
170. See Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18,26 (1944).
171. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992). The
First Circuit also stated that "[t]he historical record clearly requires a court to read the
parallel provisions of [the] DID[MC]A and the [National] Bank Act in par! materia." IcL
172- See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
173. FDIC Advisory Opinion No. 92-47, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep (CCH) 81,534, at 55,731 (July 8, 1992) (citing Letter from Frank K. Skillern, Jr.,
General Counsel, FDIC, No. 81-3, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) J1 81,006, at 55,107 (Feb. 2, 1981) (most favored lender)).
174. ld.
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corded some degree of deference. 75
V. CONCLUSION
National banks have been accorded a variety of privileges since
the enactment of the NBA in 1864.176 Beginning with the Court's in-
terpretation of the NBA in Tiffany, a national bank is allowed to
utilize the interest rate available to the "most favored lender" in the
state where the national bank is located.lV Indeed, the Tiffany deci-
sion enables a national bank to charge the rate allowed by natural
persons under state law even if state banks are limited to a lesser
amount. The Court expanded the reach of the "most favored
lender" doctrine to interstate transactions by announcing in Mar-
quette that a national bank is allowed to charge borrowers in other
states the interest rate authorized by the bank's home state even if
that rate exceeds the usury laws of the states in which borrowers re-
side. 79  In light of this history, the Smiley Court's broad
interpretation of the term "interest" in section 85 to include late
payment fees... can hardly come as a surprise. The Smiley decision
can be viewed as merely a continuation of the favorable treatment
bestowed on national banks over the past century and a quarter.
However, while the practice of giving national banks favorable
treatment is firmly established, the continued validity of that practice
should not go unquestioned in light of the potential consequences.
The Smiley Court's deference to the Comptroller's extremely broad
interpretation of the term "interest" in section 85 could potentially
result in many other fees being "exported" by national banks under, • -181
the Court's holding in Marquette. As a result, consumer protection
usury laws will continue to be overridden by banks in states with
more lenient usury laws under the "exportation" doctrine.' Fur-
thermore, although the wisdom of interpreting late payment fees as
175. Indeed, the Smiley Court alluded that agency administrative practice is given
some degree of deference by stating that the Court would deny deference "to agency
litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative
practice." Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996) (quoting
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
176. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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"exportable interest" can be questioned because of the potential
harm to the ability of states to enact effective usury laws, state banks,
not directly impacted by the Smiley decision, could be discriminated
against if they are not also allowed to "export" late payment fees as a
form of "interest." 183
In light of this potential discrimination against state banks, state
banks should also be allowed to "export" late payment fees as
"interest" for several reasons. First, Congress expressly stated that it
was trying to prevent discrimination against state banks in the text of
section 1831d.1 4 Second, the term "interest" in section 1831d should
be interpreted for state banks the same as the term "interest" in sec-
tion 85 is interpreted for national banks based on the similar
language of the two statutes."' Finally, the FDIC legal staff inter-
prets section 1831d to include late payment fees as "interest" for
state banks.'
In summary, the Smiley decision is a major victory for national
banks and enables them to maintain uniform, national pricing of their
credit cards. However, the Smiley decision arguably gives national
banks this ability at the expense of consumers. Whether one agrees
with the Smiley decision or not, perhaps the Marquette Court summa-
rized it best when it declared that "the protection of state usury laws
is an issue of legislative policy, and any plea to alter § 85 to further
that end is better addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the
judgment of this Court. '
KAREN MOWER
183. See supra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
187. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
319 (1978).
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